The ability to add Internet connectivity to devices has become very easy with the addition of an additional chip to handle to connects. But adding the necessary security is no so easy. There is no chip that can be added to provide security.
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/04/how-the-internet-of-things-could-be-fatal.html
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Discuss some of the tools I am using to make systems more secure as well as tools that make System Administration easiere.
Monday, March 7, 2016
Friday, March 4, 2016
Problems with reporting attribution of cyber attacks in Threat Intelligence.
Companies are trying to get headlines by announcing attribute for cyber attacks seen in Threat Intellingence reporting. There are problems with Attributing where a cyber attack which may lead to wrong decisions about how to block them.
http://www.robertmlee.org/the-problems-with-seeking-and-avoiding-true-attribution-to-cyber-attacks/
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http://www.robertmlee.org/the-problems-with-seeking-and-avoiding-true-attribution-to-cyber-attacks/
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Wednesday, March 2, 2016
Microsoft relases an updated Windows Defencer on Windows 10
Microsoft has just added Network Threat Protection to their Windows Defender built into Windows 10. http://news.softpedia.com/news/microsoft-launches-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection-501198.shtml
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Paper about forenics on Virtual OS running on a Thumbdrive.
Performing Forensics on a Virtual OS on a Thumb Drive can be challenging. This paper walks through some of the gotchas.
Tracing Forensic Artifacts from USB-Bound Computing Environments on Windows Hosts
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Friday, February 26, 2016
New Threat Intelligence sharing coming from DHS
DHS has been tasked with sharing their Threat Intelligence with Businesses in an effort to improve cyber_security.
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/DHS-Ready-to-Share-Intelligence-With-Private-Sector-83127.html
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Monday, February 22, 2016
Exploring Prefetch Files
One of the first things I look at when performing forensics on a system is the prefetch files which gives a report about recently run software on the system. Some malwre now recognize the importance of these files and delete them when they run.
For cases where there is still prefetch files there is a great open source tools to parse them and convert the output to a useable format.
Here is the link:
https://github.com/EricZimmerman/PECmd
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For cases where there is still prefetch files there is a great open source tools to parse them and convert the output to a useable format.
Here is the link:
https://github.com/EricZimmerman/PECmd
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MALTRAIL - Malware Network Sensor
There is a github project to build a network based malware detection system. This system uses blacklist and other open source information to build up a scoring system for network traffic that indicates the presence of malware.
I have not tested this system yet, however we are in the process of bringing in new equipment which frees up some older equipment to run tests on.
Here is the link:
https://github.com/stamparm/maltrail
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I have not tested this system yet, however we are in the process of bringing in new equipment which frees up some older equipment to run tests on.
Here is the link:
https://github.com/stamparm/maltrail
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Analyze Volume Shadow Copies
Back in December, Harlan Carvey posted a blog about the use of tools to analyze Volume Shadow Copies to uncover historic information about the operations of a system.
If malware has been running for a while or the user has been performing activities of interest, then looking at the Volume Shadow Copies can aid in that investigation.
Here is the link:
http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2015/12/working-with-shadow-volumes.html
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If malware has been running for a while or the user has been performing activities of interest, then looking at the Volume Shadow Copies can aid in that investigation.
Here is the link:
http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2015/12/working-with-shadow-volumes.html
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Using Python to mount a Forensics Image
The folks at Hacking Exposed have a good article about using the libraries in SleuthKit to mount image files using Python.
I have not tried this process out but I can image an automates tool which would make use of these libraries.
Here is the link:
Hacking Exposed Computer Forensics Blog: How to install dfVFS on Windows without compiling
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I have not tried this process out but I can image an automates tool which would make use of these libraries.
Here is the link:
Hacking Exposed Computer Forensics Blog: How to install dfVFS on Windows without compiling
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Critical Stack
In December I found Critical Stack which adds Threat Intelligence feeds to the BRO network monitoring tool. I find that BRO is a good compliment to running SNORT due to the ability to report on the URLs in the network traffic, what software is being used ( although SNORT is trting to add this feature), additional information about encrypted sessions, and netwflow data.
Critical Stack is easy to setup and has a web interface to pick and choose which Threat Intelligence feed you want to use. It then automates the process of receiving updates from the feeds, which are used to flag traffic as it goes by.
Here is the link:
https://criticalstack.com/
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Critical Stack is easy to setup and has a web interface to pick and choose which Threat Intelligence feed you want to use. It then automates the process of receiving updates from the feeds, which are used to flag traffic as it goes by.
Here is the link:
https://criticalstack.com/
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NMAP has been updated to version 7
Back in November, NMAP updated to version 7. This version now includes a large number of NSE scripts which is starting to look like the Nesus scanner.
For anyone interested in scanning networks with open source tools, here is the link:
https://nmap.org/
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For anyone interested in scanning networks with open source tools, here is the link:
https://nmap.org/
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Mandiant Volatility Plugin
Back in November Mandiant released a new Volatility plugin which looks for the ShimCache registry keys in memory. The Registry keys on the disk get up dated when the system shutdowns which in the case of an investigation is not normally done. This means the list of recently run executables is missed.
For anyoine doing Memory Forensics here is the link:
Shim Shady: Live Investigations of the Application Compatibility Cache « Threat Research | FireEye Inc
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For anyoine doing Memory Forensics here is the link:
Shim Shady: Live Investigations of the Application Compatibility Cache « Threat Research | FireEye Inc
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White House Cybersecurity initiative
Have not posted in a while, but I have been watching the developments in Ultra High Performance Concrete.
Reminds me of the Concrete ships in WWII which were a quick solution but failed due to rusting of the steel rebar. The new concrete does not need rebar or can use Basalt rebar as a replacement.
Back to posting on Cyber Security:
The White House released new executive order for improving cyber-security in the Federal Government. There is more money available with carious organizations given the job of leading the new efforts.
Here is the link to the document.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2016/m-16-04.pdf
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Reminds me of the Concrete ships in WWII which were a quick solution but failed due to rusting of the steel rebar. The new concrete does not need rebar or can use Basalt rebar as a replacement.
Back to posting on Cyber Security:
The White House released new executive order for improving cyber-security in the Federal Government. There is more money available with carious organizations given the job of leading the new efforts.
Here is the link to the document.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2016/m-16-04.pdf
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Friday, February 15, 2013
Build a testing platform for Operating System Security
There is a big problem in defending systems today. The majority of systems are using the secure configuration as defined by the CIS and NSA as well as others. These configurations are decide upon by a group of system administrators and can take many months or years before they are published and used. There needs to be proactive research in this part of security.
The current field of security research seems to be more about various ways to attack an operating system. There needs to be research in how to defend a system as well. This research needs to be done in a more consistent manner which can be reproduced by others.
I would like to propose a method to make this happen. I keep thinking of the movie "Virtuosity" where a virtual personality was attacked by various other evil personalities until a final personality emerged. I am hoping for more of a string defender to come out in this case.
For the testing platform, I am proposing Software Testing Automation Framework (STAF) which could be used to establish a standard method for security researchers. STAF can be used for testing attacks and defenses of various operating system.
I could see the system being used with three types of system. The attacker system loaded with metasploit so some other attack tools. A system to monitor the communications between the system. A third type which will the victim system.
The victim system would start as a generic version of an operating system or a version that matches the one being used in the environment of the researchers. This system will be attacked by the tools and monitored for changes.
There are two goals for each of these tests. The first is to find a way for the victim system to report that it is being attacked and by what method it is being attacked. The second is to find a mitigation or protection for the system from the attack.
The reporting is very important because the System Administrator and Security need to know that a system is being attacked. Without reporting the attacker can try many different forms of his attack until one works.
The changes need to report and defend against each attack need to be posted to a server where other researchers using the same system can make use of the results.
The plan would be to test all available attack tools against an operating system and have a central website where system defenders could make use of this research to protect their systems.
The first run through of the tests would be the hardest as a method for reporting will need to be found and tested. The next hardest piece will finding the mitigation against the attacks.
Once the first run though has been done, the system could then easy be used to test patches to the operating system and changes in the attack tools to verify if there are any changes needed in the reporting and defense of the operating system. All of this should be reported to a central site where defenders can keep their systems current.
If this research happens and system become less vulnerable, I could see the hackers job becoming a lot harder.
The current field of security research seems to be more about various ways to attack an operating system. There needs to be research in how to defend a system as well. This research needs to be done in a more consistent manner which can be reproduced by others.
I would like to propose a method to make this happen. I keep thinking of the movie "Virtuosity" where a virtual personality was attacked by various other evil personalities until a final personality emerged. I am hoping for more of a string defender to come out in this case.
For the testing platform, I am proposing Software Testing Automation Framework (STAF) which could be used to establish a standard method for security researchers. STAF can be used for testing attacks and defenses of various operating system.
I could see the system being used with three types of system. The attacker system loaded with metasploit so some other attack tools. A system to monitor the communications between the system. A third type which will the victim system.
The victim system would start as a generic version of an operating system or a version that matches the one being used in the environment of the researchers. This system will be attacked by the tools and monitored for changes.
There are two goals for each of these tests. The first is to find a way for the victim system to report that it is being attacked and by what method it is being attacked. The second is to find a mitigation or protection for the system from the attack.
The reporting is very important because the System Administrator and Security need to know that a system is being attacked. Without reporting the attacker can try many different forms of his attack until one works.
The changes need to report and defend against each attack need to be posted to a server where other researchers using the same system can make use of the results.
The plan would be to test all available attack tools against an operating system and have a central website where system defenders could make use of this research to protect their systems.
The first run through of the tests would be the hardest as a method for reporting will need to be found and tested. The next hardest piece will finding the mitigation against the attacks.
Once the first run though has been done, the system could then easy be used to test patches to the operating system and changes in the attack tools to verify if there are any changes needed in the reporting and defense of the operating system. All of this should be reported to a central site where defenders can keep their systems current.
If this research happens and system become less vulnerable, I could see the hackers job becoming a lot harder.
Make production Linux system more like LiveCD
I had a few thoughts about making Linux more secure by way of a few mechanisms already in the operating system.
The filesystem for Linux includes the ability to make a file immutable, a.k.a. can not be changed, only read. It should be possible to make a version of yum or any updater aware of this feature. So in this case, when a system update comes in the, the updater verifies all of the signatures and security of the files, then quickly turns off immutable for the file to be updated, overwrites that file and then turns on immutable again. This would prevent an attacker from changing critical system files with malicious code.
The files in sbin should only be executed by root, so in this case the permissions should be 500 since there is no need to write to any of these files. If a user needs to run this file, they will need to have sudo access to it.
There should be no files in the sbin or buin directory that has world enabled flags and no write flags should be on as well.
Configuration files should also be immutable with a separate program to modify them. This should include a way to verify that the file was only changed by this program; a hash signature tied to a database that can be checked.
Log files should be set with the append only flag and when they are rolled over they should be set with the immutable flag until they are ready to be deleted.
Library files need to be just library files. The system should check to see that when a library file is called, that it really is a library file and not an executable. Executable files need to be labeled and in the bin or sbin directory.
The system would need to have a program that verifies the signatures of the files that are on the system, much like 'rpm -Va' but with additional check to make sure that the files are immutable and that configuration files have only been updated by their configuration programs.
All of the above checks could then be used by a kernel that verifies the signature of a program before allowing it to execute.
All of the pieces to make this happen are in Linux today, they just need to be pulled together.
Ultimately the operating system would need to change to two version, one without these protections that would be for development and the other for production. A development version would be used by the developers and when they are done, the program files will need to be packaged up and signed. This would enable the production system to verify that the codes have meet some form of security before being installed on the system.
The filesystem for Linux includes the ability to make a file immutable, a.k.a. can not be changed, only read. It should be possible to make a version of yum or any updater aware of this feature. So in this case, when a system update comes in the, the updater verifies all of the signatures and security of the files, then quickly turns off immutable for the file to be updated, overwrites that file and then turns on immutable again. This would prevent an attacker from changing critical system files with malicious code.
The files in sbin should only be executed by root, so in this case the permissions should be 500 since there is no need to write to any of these files. If a user needs to run this file, they will need to have sudo access to it.
There should be no files in the sbin or buin directory that has world enabled flags and no write flags should be on as well.
Configuration files should also be immutable with a separate program to modify them. This should include a way to verify that the file was only changed by this program; a hash signature tied to a database that can be checked.
Log files should be set with the append only flag and when they are rolled over they should be set with the immutable flag until they are ready to be deleted.
Library files need to be just library files. The system should check to see that when a library file is called, that it really is a library file and not an executable. Executable files need to be labeled and in the bin or sbin directory.
The system would need to have a program that verifies the signatures of the files that are on the system, much like 'rpm -Va' but with additional check to make sure that the files are immutable and that configuration files have only been updated by their configuration programs.
All of the above checks could then be used by a kernel that verifies the signature of a program before allowing it to execute.
All of the pieces to make this happen are in Linux today, they just need to be pulled together.
Ultimately the operating system would need to change to two version, one without these protections that would be for development and the other for production. A development version would be used by the developers and when they are done, the program files will need to be packaged up and signed. This would enable the production system to verify that the codes have meet some form of security before being installed on the system.
Wednesday, December 8, 2010
Not happy with secstate
I finally got a chance to install RedHat 6, but I am having troubles getting secstate started. After some digging, I found a reference to missing puppet configuration files. Looks like I will have to wait for secstate to come out of beta; but I still like the concept of locking down a system and keeping it locked-down.
P.S.> Finally found the examples, but I was hoping for more. At least an example to would put a system into FDCC/USGCB format. The authors of secstate come from TreSys CLIP project which uses Puppet to maintain a system in a secure state.
P.S.> Finally found the examples, but I was hoping for more. At least an example to would put a system into FDCC/USGCB format. The authors of secstate come from TreSys CLIP project which uses Puppet to maintain a system in a secure state.
Tuesday, October 26, 2010
Some random thoughts
Still waiting for RedHat 6.0 to be released: The new program secstate looks very interesting. It is being published from Tresys which has a CLIP project in place. This is a version of RedHat which has been locked down based on the CIS benchmark or in this case the new FDCC / USGBC standard. The important thing is the use of puppet in both cases to manage the secure configuration.
I also like how they (Tresys) have mapped some of the CLIP security controls back to FISMA controls; So, with some sort of reporting on the status of the system, it is possible to automate reporting of how the system is doing in terms of FISMA.
I also like how they (Tresys) have mapped some of the CLIP security controls back to FISMA controls; So, with some sort of reporting on the status of the system, it is possible to automate reporting of how the system is doing in terms of FISMA.
Wednesday, October 20, 2010
EMET from Microsoft
Busy day for Posting: Another thing I have come across is the EMET tool from Microsoft. It basically wraps security around other programs and runs on Windows XP SP3 and later. It does solve the security problems in these programs, but provides protection until a patch can be applied. For example, (not picking on Adobe), but if a malicous pdf is run inside Adobe Reader, EMET will step in and crash Reader to prevent the bad codes from running, thus protecting the system from infection.
So far I have tested it with firefox, Internet Explorer, java and Adobe reader. Also I have wrapped the svchost program which connects the system to the Internet. In addition, I have wrapped lssas which is the local security authentication server. I know the best method is to always know the source of the files you download and scan them with an Antivirus tool; but any extra protection is always welcome.
So far I have tested it with firefox, Internet Explorer, java and Adobe reader. Also I have wrapped the svchost program which connects the system to the Internet. In addition, I have wrapped lssas which is the local security authentication server. I know the best method is to always know the source of the files you download and scan them with an Antivirus tool; but any extra protection is always welcome.
Ultimate Goal for a Secure system
I have been looking into ways to make my systems the most secure as possible, but making sure my users are able to do their work. One the things I have been following is the use of micro-kernels; this reduces your "Attack Surface" since there is less of the kernel to attack. Also there is a micro-kernel (SEL4) which has been verified by means of Formal Methods to be a very secure kernel. However it is not available for use as a Linux kernel replacement. Its cousin L4 can be used as a Linux kernel replacement very certain functions which I may be looking into.
Another method of securing the system is to look into Trusted Computing. They are generated a trusted system by starting at the boot level. There is code available to verify if the BIOS boot-loader can be trusted. Then the next step is to see if the GRUB or LILO loader can be trusted and finally testing to see if the OS that is loaded can be trusted. Unfortunately there has been problems; Trusted Computing has been advertised as a means to make sure that copyrighted material is not copied and are being controlled by the copyright owner. There has been many cases like Sony and others where the copyright control has gone to far. Another problem is that the chain of trust starts at the BIOS level and it has been shown that a rogue BIOS can be planted on one of the peripheral devices and use to bypass the chain of trust of the main BIOS on the motherboard. These issues might explain why there has not been much work on Trusted Computing since 2008.
Another method of securing the system is to look into Trusted Computing. They are generated a trusted system by starting at the boot level. There is code available to verify if the BIOS boot-loader can be trusted. Then the next step is to see if the GRUB or LILO loader can be trusted and finally testing to see if the OS that is loaded can be trusted. Unfortunately there has been problems; Trusted Computing has been advertised as a means to make sure that copyrighted material is not copied and are being controlled by the copyright owner. There has been many cases like Sony and others where the copyright control has gone to far. Another problem is that the chain of trust starts at the BIOS level and it has been shown that a rogue BIOS can be planted on one of the peripheral devices and use to bypass the chain of trust of the main BIOS on the motherboard. These issues might explain why there has not been much work on Trusted Computing since 2008.
Attack Surface
I learned a new term for protecting systems. The Attack surface; so deleting unused services, packages and accounts you reduce the "Attack Surface" of the system and make it more secure. There are tools in development which will be able to test a system a generate a score for the "Attack Surface" of the system. This will not make the systems more secure but provide a means to see which systems need more attention and unfortunately or fortunately provide a metric for management about the current security state of the systems.
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